![]() ![]() SHA1: 4fab28b1bbce94f077861ca2d9d8299b005fa961 (SHA1)ĪSERT keeps tabs on DDoS botnets and their attack activity with our BladeRunnerbotnet monitoring system and kypitestru is no exception.Visiting the bot’s C2 panel confirms this suspicion: The HTTP request exhibits telltale signs of the G-Bot DDoS bot. ![]() This malware’s C2 domain is “kypitestru” and its phone home looks like: Once released, it was picked up by ASERT’s malware zoo and others. d361e3ddfc4e6f03ed7bad5586934854478708a5 (SHA1)įorceful’s mistake was that instead of deleting the test executable, it was distributed into the wild.At the bottom of the screenshot, it lists the following hashes of the crypted executable: As with the other participants in the thread, Forceful posted a screenshot of the results of a virus scanning service to test how effective the crypter was on a malware sample. The actor was participating in a forum discussion about a crypter–a tool used to encrypt/obfuscate malware executables to help evade antivirus detection and hinder analysis. These mistakes come in a number of flavors and this was one of Forceful’s: Making the jump from ad to botnet usually requires the threat actor making a public operational security (OPSEC) mistake. What these ads usually don’t contain, however, are the command and control (C2) details of their botnets used to carry out the purchased DDoS attacks. ![]()
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